Since making his Major League debut with the Oakland Athletics in 2017, Matt Chapman has been one of the best all-around third basemen in all of Major League Baseball. Combining elite defense with above-average offensive production throughout his time in the Major Leagues with Oakland and Toronto, Chapman has produced a wRC+ of at least 110 in every season except for 2021, when he produced a wRC+ of 101, and has consistently been in the top tier of defensive third basemen as measured by Outs Above Average. Despite these outstanding credentials, Chapman remained a free agent until March 2nd, when he signed a 3 year, $54M contract (with a player option after each season) with the San Francisco Giants. In this article, I will be conducting an in-depth analysis of Matt Chapman’s offensive profile, as despite producing impressive batted ball metrics, his steady decline in Pulled Fly Ball Rate as well as a weakness against high Fastballs may have impacted some team’s projections of his overall production heading into the latter-half of his career.
Background:
As mentioned earlier, Matt Chapman has consistently produced at an above-average level throughout the duration of his Major League career. While the days of him producing ISO’s of over .230 (as he did in 2018 and 2019) are likely behind him, Chapman is still capable at generating plus power as evident by his Barrel Rate and Hard Hit Rate. At 56.4%, Chapman’s Hard Hit Rate ranked as the 2nd highest among all qualified hitters in 2023, while his 17.1% Barrel Rate was tied for 4th highest among qualified hitters. While a 10.7% Walk Rate is already above league-average, Chapman’s underlying plate discipline metrics are even more impressive, as he produced a 22.5% O-Swing and 112.12 swRV+ last season.
This combination of hitting the ball hard and making good swing decisions is something that analysts look for every player, and when combined with plus defensive ability, it is no surprise that Chapman is consistently a 4 win player year after year. While these underlying metrics provide Chapman with a solid floor, there are a couple of questions that have developed over the past season, such as his declining ability to pull fly balls and hit upstairs Fastballs, which could affect how high his ceiling is moving forward.
Concern #1 - Opposite Field Fly Balls:
Over the past four seasons, Matt Chapman has hit for a consistently high Fly Ball Rate (over 48%), which has allowed him to produce many Barrels given his demonstrated ability to hit the ball hard. While the spray angle of a fly ball matters less the harder the ball is hit (ex. when hit with an exit velocity greater than 110 mph), most production is typically generated on pulled fly balls, a topic that many analysts including myself have touched upon in recent months. While Chapman has shown an ability to pull fly balls with consistency in the past, this trend has declined over the past two seasons, and it may indicate that Chapman will be able to hit for less power in the future as his exit velocities decrease as he ages.
As shown by the table above, Chapman has seen a steady decline in Pulled Fly Ball Rate, Opt_95 (the percentage of batted balls between an exit velocity of 95-105 mph that are pulled fly balls), and Pull Rate since the 2021 season. This can be considered a worrisome development, as Chapman has to depend on his raw power in order to maintain his in-game power production, which may prove to be difficult as he ages. Combined with the expansive right-center field of his new home ballpark, Chapman may experience some adversity when it comes to hitting for power, especially if his Max. Exit Velocity decreases to around 110 mph. In addition, Chapman’s propensity to hit a lot of fly balls, while allowing him to maximize power output, typically results in a lower BABIP. Chapman produced a .319 BABIP in 2023, and I would expect this to regress to around .270-.280 in 2024, barring a major change in his batted ball profile.
Whether or not Chapman increases his Pulled Fly Ball Rate will be one particular development I will be keeping a close eye on early in the season. If the Pull Rate is back above 40% and the Pulled Fly Ball Rate is close to 10% in the first month of the season, then I can be confident that the regression was simply a one-year blip and would be more bullish on my power projection for Chapman moving forward. If the Pull Rate and Pulled Fly Ball Rate remain at 2023 levels, then it might be an indicator that Chapman is on the “other side” of the aging curve and his power production could see a major decrease once his batted ball metrics begin to regress.
Concern #2 - Struggles on Upstairs Fastballs:
Another point of concern in Matt Chapman’s offensive profile is his recent struggles against Four Seam Fastballs located up in the zone. As has been discussed frequently in recent baseball discourse, Four Seam Fastballs located up in the zone with “ride” have been effective at generating Whiffs in recent seasons, and are generally excellent pitches for a pitcher to build their arsenal around. While it is not uncommon to see hitters have some level with this pitch (given its general effectiveness), Chapman has shown a concerning tendency to frequently swing-and-miss at these types of pitches.
The heat maps above are from all Four Seam Fastballs that Chapman faced during the 2023 season. These heat maps are what first drew my attention to Chapman’s difficulties handling upstairs Fastballs, as that is a lot of “blue” present at the top of the zone on the Contact% heat map. As mentioned earlier, Chapman has excellent plate discipline which allows him to theoretically lay off these pitches when he is ahead in the count, but this weakness can make him particularly vulnerable when he is facing a two-strike count.
As shown by the tables above, Chapman displays very high Whiff Rates on Fastballs located upstairs, and swings at these pitches more frequently than pitches located elsewhere in the zone (when compared to his Z-Swing% and O-Swing%). Chapman particularly struggles in these areas against Fastballs with plus vertical movement, defined as Four Seamers with at least 16 inches of induced vertical movement, with a Whiff Rate of 53.7% on these pitches located in the upper third or above the zone.
It would not surprise me if opposing pitchers start attacking Chapman with Four Seamers in this area of the strike zone more frequently this season given his tendency to swing-and-miss at these pitches. There are two methods in which Chapman can improve his weakness in this area. Given his plus plate discipline, Chapman could place an increased emphasis on laying off these pitches when he’s ahead in the count, in hopes of receiving a pitch later in the count that provides him with a higher likelihood to make contact and generate offensive production with. Chapman could also attempt to make an adjustment to his swing to make more contact on these pitches (particularly with two strikes), which would improve his strikeout totals but might come at the expense of power production. Both “fixes” are obviously easier said than done, but I believe it is important that Chapman finds a way to mitigate this weakness as it is a flaw that could become quite exploitable by opposing pitchers. Similar to the concerns about his Pulled Fly Ball Rate, Chapman’s performance on upstairs Fastballs will be a development I will be keeping a close eye on early in the season and will be a major factor in projecting Chapman’s offensive production as he heads into his 30’s.
Concluding Thoughts:
While Matt Chapman has provided elite defensive ability and above-average offensive production to every team he has played for throughout his Major League, his decline in Pulled Fly Ball Rate and weakness on upstairs Fastballs creates some question marks on how his offensive production projects into the latter half of his career. I will say that I hope that this piece did not come off as too much of an anti-Matt Chapman article, as I am a fan of his overall skillset and I believe that the contract he signed with San Francisco assigns a fair value to his projected future performance.
Using the method of regressing his Steamer projection by 0.5 WAR per year and valuing each win above replacement as $9M, Chapman’s contract he signed with San Francisco just about meets the terms that this process projects for him. Despite the question marks surrounding some elements of his offensive production, Chapman’s defensive ability and underlying batted ball metrics provide him a solid floor that makes this contract a “safe bet” for San Francisco over the next three seasons. If Chapman is able to resolve his issues against upstairs Fastballs and regain his ability to pull the ball in the air, then Matt Chapman will once again be the best third baseman in Major League Baseball and potentially become an integral piece of the next San Francisco Giants team to make the Postseason.
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Photo credits to Getty Images and The Canadian Press.